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Abstract
The role of the courts in the protection of human rights in any legal system is a constitutionally
sensitive one. The observance and protection of such rights articulate with many aspects of the exercise of governmental and legislative power. The value nature of human rights accentuates these
sensibilities. Some have viewed sovereign law as an essential ingredient in the make-up of national
identity, a perception which tends to confirm a presumption that legal systems, while responsive
to new pressures, are nonetheless holistic, coherent, and state-bound. National law is a rampart
against outside corruption of the national ethos. Inevitably all of this poses particular challenges
for a supranational court with jurisdiction to pass judgment on human rights compliance, directly
or indirectly, by states that are justly proud of their own legal democratic traditions. The exercise
by the European Court of Justice (“Court of Justice” or “Court”) of jurisdiction to protect the individual from breaches of their fundamental rights is a constitutional role which trammels not only
the exercise of political power by the institutions of the European Community (the “Community”)
but indirectly (and often directly) the use of governmental and legislative power at a national level.
This constitutional role, exercised in the context of the doctrines of primacy and direct effect, challenges the ideology of a state’s legal autonomy and the associated sense of self-determination. Not
surprisingly, the Court of Justice at the early stages showed a marked reluctance to be drawn into
this area.

SPEECH
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LEGAL ORDER
The Hon. Mr.JusticeJohn L. Murray, ChiefJustice of Ireland*
In his work, The End of History and the Last Man, Francis
Fukuyama posed the question, "[i] n what way can we say that the
modern liberal democracy recognises all human beings universally?"'
"It does this" he responds, "by granting and protecting their
rights. That is, any human child born on the territory of... [a]
liberal state is by that very act endowed with certain rights ...."2
This underlies the historical evolution of the status of the individual in society, from the mere subject of a sovereign, then a
citizen of his or her own state to the modern era where the individual in a liberal democracy is him or herself a source of rights
by virtue of the human dignity of the person.
When a court is placed in the position of being not the first,
but the final, guarantor of the fundamental rights of the individual, it means that the "absolute supremacy or predominance of
regular laws" of which the British Constitutionalist Dicey spoke is
no longer true. 3 Such a court looks to the individual as enjoying
those fundamental rights autonomously and, more importantly,
antecedent to so-called "regular law" whose validity may be
called into question for infringing the rights vested in the individual.
The role of the courts in the protection of human rights in
any legal system is a constitutionally sensitive one. The observance and protection of such rights articulate with many aspects
* This speech was delivered at the conference "Fifty Years of European Community Law" organized by the Fordham Center on European Union Law and the Fordham
International Law Journal, February 28-March 1, 2008. It has been updated (August
2008) in light of recent developments regarding the Lisbon Treaty.
1. FRANCis FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 202 (The Free
Press, 1992).
2. Id.
3. See ALBERT VENN DICEY,INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202 (E.C.S. Wade ed., Macmillan 1939) (1885).
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of the exercise of governmental and legislative power. The value
nature of human rights accentuates these sensibilities. Some
have viewed sovereign law as an essential ingredient in the makeup of national identity, a perception which tends to confirm a
presumption that legal systems, while responsive to new pressures, are nonetheless holistic, coherent, and state-bound. National law is a rampart against outside corruption of the national
ethos.
Inevitably all of this poses particular challenges for a supranational court with jurisdiction to pass judgment on human
rights compliance, directly or indirectly, by states that are justly
proud of their own legal democratic traditions.
The exercise by the European Court of Justice ("Court of
Justice" or "Court") ofjurisdiction to protect the individual from
breaches of their fundamental rights is a constitutional role
which trammels not only the exercise of political power by the
institutions of the European Community (the "Community") but
indirectly (and often directly) the use of governmental and legislative power at a national level. This constitutional role, exercised in the context of the doctrines of primacy and direct effect,
challenges the ideology of a state's legal autonomy and the associated sense of self-determination. Not surprisingly, the Court of
Justice at the early stages showed a marked reluctance to be
drawn into this area.4
The exercise of such a far-reaching constitutional function
cannot be lightly undertaken, or more to the point, cannot be
undertaken at all, unless there is a credible legitimate basis for
doing so. Yet, as we know, the founding treaties contained no
reference to human or fundamental rights.5
If the Community was to survive, let alone develop as a supranational institution exercising sovereign powers over liberal
democracies in which fundamental individual rights were consti4. See generally Ayadi v. Council, Case T-253/02 [2006] E.C.R. II-2139; Panayotova
v. Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, Case C-327/02 [2004] E.C.R. I11055.
5. See generally Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741
[hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]); Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC
Treaty]; Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty].
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tutionally protected, it faced enormous challenges due to this
deficit.
This is an opportune occasion to reflect on the past as well
as to look afresh at the remarkable evolution of Community law,
its complexity and-perhaps most importantly-its future. If
the development of Community law may be seen as a narrative of
sorts, I am pleased to examine today one of its more important
chapters, namely, the protection of fundamental rights in the
Community legal order.
It is a chapter of the Community narrative which has been
penned in the main by judicial hands, and is of course an aspect
of the wider process, led by the Court of Justice, of creating from
the Treaty of Rome a supranational constitutional charter. The
founding milestones of this process are familiar to all of you
here and I do not need to dwell on them: the enunciation of the
doctrines of direct effect in NVAlgemene Transport-enExpedetie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration ("Van Gend en Loos") 6 and its subsequent expansion in
Van Duyn v. Home Office,' of primacy in Costa v. E.N.E.L.' and of
preemption as early as 1969 in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt.9
Through these doctrines the Court of Justice made a pivotal
contribution to Community law. Through the doctrine of direct
effect it effectively revolutionised the functional role of the
Treaty of Rome and transformed the individual citizens into
agents of integration, a dynamic force capable of promoting
evolution of this new legal order by virtue of their right to challenge, in individual cases, the compatibility of national measures
with Community law-a route that is perhaps now taken for
granted-while the doctrines of primacy and pre-emption ensured the stability and coherence of the Community legal order. 10
This new order, however, had a void at its core. Given that
6. NV Algemene Transport-en Expedetie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v.
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (Van Gend en Loos), Case 26/62 [1963]
E.C.R. 3.
7. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74 [1974] E.C.R. 1337.
8. Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64 [1964] E.C.R. 584, 614.
9. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68 [1969] E.C.R. 1.
10. See Wells v. Sec'y of State for Transport., Local Gov't & the Regions, Case C201/02 [2004] E.C.R. 1-723,
61; Hepple v. Adjudication Officer, Case C-196/98
[2000] E.C.R. 1-3701,
39-42.

534

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:531

the Treaty of Rome did not per se protect fundamental rights
(apart from the four freedoms and the prohibition of discrimination) the reluctance of the Court ofJustice to grapple with the
question of fundamental rights" soon led to disquiet on the part
of constitutional courts, primarily through the proposition, albeit hypothetical, from the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in InternationaleHandesgesel/schaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle
fir Getreide und Futtermittel ("Solange I') 2 that Community law
should be reviewed by national courts for its compatibility with
national rights standards prior to implementation.
Faced with the appalling vista of discrete clutches ofjudicial
decisions at the national level pecking at the smooth uniformity
of Community law and undermining its operation, the Court finally declared in its decision of 1974-Nold v. Commission'3-that
respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law. 4 Fundamental rights were to
be protected by the Court, within the Community legal order
and within the scope of Community law, according to an unwritten or unenumerated catalogue of rights inspired by the constitutional traditions of the Member States and international
human rights treaties to which the Member States subscribed.
Some saw this as less than a dramatic move, so that the Court of
Justice by doing so was merely, as one commentator put it, "filling a gap in the Treaty [of Rome] that practice had revealed"
and safeguarding the integrity of the Community legal order.'5
16
In later decisions such as Wachauf v. Forstwirtschaft
and

Tielorassi v. Pliroforissis'7 the Court of Justice held that its powers
of review extend to Member States' acts but only to the extent
11. For example, in Stork v. High Authority, the European Court of Justice ("Court
of Justice" or "Court") held that it had no power to examine a complaint against a
decision claimed to infringe on German constitutional law. See generally Stork v. High
Authority, Case 1/58 [1959] E.C.R. 43.
12. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide
und Futtermittel (Solange I), BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974).
13. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] E.C.R. 491.
14. The Court had already referred to fundamental ights in dicta in Stauder v. City
of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 1 7, and InternationaleHandelsgesellschaftmbH v.
Einfurh-und Voratsstellefur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1 4.
15. SeeJulio Baquero Cruz, The Changing ConstitutionalRole of the European Court of

Justice, 34

INrr'LJ. LEGAL INFo.

223, 232 (2006).

16. See generally Wachauf v. Forstwirtschaft, Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609.
17. See generally Tihelorassi v. Pliroforissis, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925.
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that those acts come within the sphere of Community law. 8
It is of course important to recall that the Court of Justice,
like any other constitutional court, has never had the power to
pick and choose when to deal with certain issues but has had to
wait for them to arise. It could only pick up its pen, if I may
continue my analogy, when requested to do so. Many of the
Court's most far-reaching decisions, including all of those to
which I have already referred with the exception of Nold, 19 have
been the result of preliminary references made by national
courts under the Article 234 [Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty" or "EC")] (formerly Article 177) procedure.20
21
This is also true of later decisions such as Francovichv. Italy
in which the Court laid down the principle of state liability with
regard to individuals for damages caused by a failure to transpose Community Directives. 2 2 Indeed, virtually every important
case in the field of non-discrimination, freedom of movement,
equality, social security, the rights of migrant workers and their
families, and health and safety in the workplace have been decided as a result of references made by national courts under
2
Article 234 EC. 1
In this manner, the development of Community law has relied not only on the willingness of national courts to refer issues
to the Court of Justice but also on their acceptance of the resultant decisions as applying not only to the instant case but as a
binding legal precedent with erga omnes effect. The national
courts, whether willingly or reluctantly, have thus played perhaps
the most dynamic role of all and the relationship between the
national courts and the Court of Justice has therefore been described as one of collaboration rather than competition or, as
24
the Court diplomatically puts it, 'dialogue.'
This is not to say, of course, that decisions have never been

18.
19.
20.
art. 234,
21.
22.
23.

See id. 41; Wachauf, [1989] E.C.R. 2609,
19.
See generally Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
O.J. C 321 E/37, at 147 (2008) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
See Francovich v. Italy, Joined Cases 6/90 & 9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357.
See id. 39.
SeeJohn L. Murray, The Dynamics of a Community Constitution, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 35-36 (Emiliou and O'Keeffe eds., 1997).
24. See generally Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective SupranationalAdjuducation, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); see also Robert B. Ahdieh,
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met with resistance. There have been periodic political 'shots
across the bows' of the Court of Justice, particularly where a preliminary reference has led to a strengthening or extension of
European Union ("EU") policy. A notable example would be
the 'Barber Protocol' saga, arising from the 1990 case of Barber v.
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group. 5 This case, in which
the Court of Justice held, in a prospective effect ruling, that occupational pensions constitute part of an employee's pay and
must therefore comply with Article 119 of the EC Treaty stipulating equal pay for men and women, saw an attempt by the Member States, spearheaded by a hostile U.K. government, to rewrite
the decision of the Court of Justice in the so-called "Barber Protocol" annexed to the Treaty of Rome by the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992, which in a subsequent case 26 was endorsed by the Court
of Justice as what it had meant to say in Barber.27
That said, attempts to constrain the Court's impact in the
field of fundamental rights have been "weak and few,"'2' and in
reality, far from being unhappy with the Court's approach, the
Member States have so far actively endorsed it.29 The Court's
leading role in the protection of fundamental rights has seen
successive treaties fashioned by the Member States traditionally
playing 'catch up,' if you will, with its case law by enshrining respect for such rights in successive treaties, from human rights
references in the Single European Act 198630 and the preamble
to the Maastricht Treaty" l to the declaration in Article 6(2) of
the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam) 3 2 that:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by
Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv.
2029, 2156-57 (2004).
25. See generally Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Group, Case C-262/88,
[1990] E.C.R. 1-1889.
26. See Ten Oever v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor bet Glazenwassers- en
Schoonmaakbedrijf, Case C-109/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-4879,
15-20.
27. See generally Barber, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1889.
28. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EuROPE 192 (2000).

29. SeeJulio Baquero Cruz, supra note 15, at 232; see also Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DuKE J. OF COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 113
(2003).
30. SEA, supra note 5, O.J. L 169/1.
31. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
pmbl., 0.J. C 321 E/l, at 9 (2008) [hereinafter TEU].
32. See id. art. 6(2), 0.J. C 321 E/l, at 11.
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[the European Convention on Human Rights] and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States, as general principles of Community law. 3
This reflects in part the Court's own statement in Nold v.
Commission that in safeguarding fundamental rights it "is bound
to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States,"3 4 and that "international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Member States have
collaborated or of which they are signatories can supply guidelines which should be followed in the framework of Community
law. "35

As the late Federico Mancini observed in 1989, while the
principle of respect for fundamental rights "was forced on the
Court from the outside, by the German and, later, the Italian
Constitutional Courts, ' 36 the Court's reading of an unwritten bill
of rights into Community law is its "most striking contribution"
to the development of a constitution for Europe. 7 Achieved
within, and parallel to, the overall process of constitutionalization, it has resulted in a situation where, in an ever-increasing
field of Community competences, every citizen now has equal
rights that can be enforced before the Court, and indeed before
national courts, or as Advocate General Jacobs put it in Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt,3 8 " [i] n other words, [a Community national] is entitled to say 'civis europeus sum' and to invoke that status in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights."3 9
The content of this unwritten bill of rights is of course, by its
very nature, impossible to ascertain definitively. However, a
number of points are clear. One is that the Court's references to
national constitutions as a source of rights have been sporadic
and perfunctory, rather than systematic or scientific.4" Another
is that the European Convention on Human Rights (the "Euro33. See id.
34. See Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73 [1974] E.C.R. 491, 507.
35. See id.
36. G. Federico Mancini, A Constitutionfor Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 595,
611 (1989).
37. See id.
38. See Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt, Case 168/91 [1993] E.C.R. I1191., 46.
39. See id. at 1212, 46.
40. See Nial Fennelly, Pillar Talk: Fundamental Rights Protection in the European
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pean Convention" or "ECHR")4" has played, and was bound to
play, an increasingly central role in the Court's case law as a
source from which inspiration may be drawn in fundamental
rights cases, in comparison to which, other international sources
of inspiration referred to, such as various other Council of Europe instruments, and those emanating from the United Nations
and the International Labour Organisation ("ILO") have played
bit parts.
While the Court of Justice has never said that the European
Convention is formally binding on the Community or that its
provisions are directly incorporated into Community law,4 2 it
recognized the European Convention's pre-eminence as early as
199143 and has repeatedly affirmed that the Convention has
"special significance" in fundamental rights cases." Indeed, the
Court of Justice's use of decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights (the "Strasbourg Court") to define the scope of
fundamental rights in Community law4 5 has led to the observation that it has blurred the distinction between the Convention
as an 'inspiration' for fundamental rights and as a 'source' of
such rights.4 6

On the other hand, the Court has consistently stated that
the nature and scope of a fundamental right must be determined autonomously in Community law.4 7 The expansion of
the Community's competence in the protection of fundamental
rights has not only focused attention on this unwritten bill of
Union, 1 JUD. STUD. INST. J. 95, 100 (2008), available at http://www.jsijournal.ie/html/
Volume%208%2ONo.%201/2008 [1 ] _FennellyFundamentalRights.pdf.
41. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
42. P. CRAIG & G. DE BORCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 384 (4th ed.
2008).
41.
43. Ti61orassi v. Pliroforissis, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925,
44. See e.g., Kremzow v. Austria, Case C-299/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-2629, 14; Booker
Aquacultur Ltd. v. The Scottish Ministers, Joined Cases C-20/00 & C-64/00, [2003]
E.C.R. 1-7411, 1 65.
45. See, e.g., Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 2859,
13-18; Hils AG v. Commission, Case C-199/92P, [1999] E.C.R. 1-4287,
62; Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Hacene Akrich, Case C-109/01, [2003] E.C.R. I9607, 58; Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-60/00, [2002] E.C.R.
1-6279, 1 41.
46. D. WYATT ET AL., WYATIT AND DASHWOOD'S EUROPEAN UNION LAW 272 (5th ed.
2006).
47. See, e.g.,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle
fir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1 3-4.
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rights but, more importantly, raised the spectre of a duality and
divergence emerging between the supranational Community legal order and the international system of the European Convention, which some view as undesirable.
The argument has been repeatedly made that the only satisfactory resolution to the question of divergence is for the Community to accede to the European Convention, an option which
was discussed as early as 197948 and which the Court held, in its
Opinion 2/94"9 on accession, would require Treaty amendment.
Accession is also said to be the only solution to the prevailing
anomaly whereby, despite the fact that the acts of the EU itself
may not currently be challenged directly in the Strasbourg
Court, a Member State may be held responsible for alleged violations of a Convention right through the enactment of national
legislation implementing Community law,5" thereby trapping
them between the 'rock' of Community law and the 'hard place'
of Convention obligations.
A response to both questions has been provided, not by the
Court of Justice, but by the Member States, first, through the
'solemn proclamation' of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
(the "Charter") at the Nice Summit of 2000,51 which would be
given binding legal status by the Treaty of Lisbon 52 -the adoption of which is now much less assured, given the rejection of the
Treaty by the Irish electorate in a referendum on the 12th of
June 2008 5 -and second, by providing for accession by the
Union to the European Convention in that same Treaty.5 4 How48. See generally Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on
Human Rights: Commission Memorandum, COM (79) 210 Final (April 1979) (analyzing for the first time the issue of accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR")).
49. Opinion of the European Court of Justice Regarding the Accession by the
Community to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759, 11 34-35.
50. See P. CRAiIG & G. DE BORCA, supra note 42, at 420-24.
51. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 364/01 (2000)
[hereinafter Charter].
52. Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty) art. 6(1), O.J. C 306/01, at 135 (2007),
opened for signature Dec. 13, 2007 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Reform Treaty] ("The
Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.").
53. The Lisbon Treaty requires ratification by all twenty-seven Member States of
the European Union ("EU") to come into force.
54. See Reform Treaty, supra note 52, art. 6(2), O.J. C 306/01, at 135 ("The Union
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ever, while portrayed as necessary and complementary steps in
the furtherance of fundamental rights protection at Community
level, these political measures raise potentially serious concerns.
For present purposes I do not wish to dwell too long on the
Charter. A syncretic document, containing rights derived from a
wide array of sources, including the European Convention and
other instruments referred to in the case law of the Court of
Justice, 55 it has been somewhat dubiously portrayed by various
political actors in the EU as merely crystallizing and clarifying
the catalogue of rights developed in the Court's case law.5 6
While it does not establish any new power for the Community or
the EU, it does contain numerous innovations (for example,
provisions on biotechnology such as the prohibition on human
cloning) 57 and a commitment to open-ended abstract concepts,
such as the dignity of the individual. 5 It also contains a more
neutrally worded right to marriage5 9 which excludes the reference in Article 12 of the European Convention to "men and women," 60 a difference highlighted by the Strasbourg Court in the
Goodwin v. United Kingdom6 case, to which I refer below.
The Charter's current legal status is also somewhat ambiguous. While, pending adoption and entry into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon, it is not legally binding, it has already been accorded
an influential place in Community law, firstly, through its endorsement by all EU institutions,6 2 its formal use, under Rule 34
shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competence as defined in the Treaties.").
55. See generally Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R.
491 (fundamental rights of the person).
56. See generally Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455 (right to equal
pay for equal work); Prais v. Council, Case 130/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1589 (religious freedom).
57. Charter, supra note 51, art. 3(2), O.J. C 364/01, at 3 (the prohibition of the
reproductive cloning of human beings).
58. See id., pmbl., at 2 ("Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is
founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity.") (emphasis added).
59. See id. art. 9, at 4 ("The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be
guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these
rights.").
60. See ECHR, supra note 41, art. 12, Rome, Nov. 4, 1950 ("Men and women of
marriageable age have the right to marry . .

").

61. See generally Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 3.
62. Even before the "solemn proclamation" of the Charter at the Nice Summit in
2000, the European Commission had stated in a Communication that "[i]t is reasona-
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of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament,6" as a
fundamental rights standard against which legislative acts may be
measured, and as a source of rights in opinions of Advocates
General of the Court and decisions of the Court of First Instance
("CFI") 64 In addition, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice in 2006 recognized the importance attached to the Charter
by the EU Council.6" However, it must be noted that thus far,
references made to the Charter by the Tribunal and the Court of
Justice have largely been window dressing in cases where the
right identified has been firmly established by the case law of the
Court or where the right is already extant in the Treaty of Rome,
for example, in the Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n and Finnish
Seamen's Union v. Viking Line ABP and OU Viking Line Eesti decision of the Grand Chamber in December 2007.66
It would appear reasonable to assume that it is unlikely the
Charter will be used in any bold decision until and unless it is
rendered legally binding through adoption of the Lisbon Treaty,
at which point other issues, such as its relationship to the European Convention, will give rise to more concrete scrutiny, especially where there is a divergence in the text or legal context. In
ble to assume that the Charter will produce all its effects, legal and others, whatever its
nature .. . [i]t is clear that it would be difficult for the Council and the Commission,
who are to proclaim it solemnly, to ignore in the future, in their legislative function, an
instrument prepared at the request of the European Council by the full range of
sources of national and European legitimacy acting in concert." See Communication
from the Commission on the Legal Nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, COM 644 Final (2000), point 10.
63. See generally Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Rule 34, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef //EP//TEXT+RULES-EP+200810
("Examination
10+RULE-034 OC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&navigationBar=YES
of respect for fundamental rights, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the
rule of law, and financial implications.").
64. See, e.g.,J6go-Qur6 & Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-177/01, (2002] E.C.R. II02365, 47 (holding that the applicant was entitled to an "effective remedy" in light of
Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, that neither Articles 234, 235, nor Article 288 offered J6go-Qu& effective protection and removing the requirement that the applicant be "individually" concerned).
But see Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R I06677,
39-40 (reaffirming that individuals had a right to effective judicial protection, but holding that this was to be achieved through the combination of Articles 230,
241, and 234).
65. See European Parliament v. Council, Case C-540/03, Grand Chamber, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-05769,
38.
66. See Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n and Finnish Seamen's Union v. Viking Line
ABP and O0 Viking Line Eesti, Case C-438/05, Grand Chamber, [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779.
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this connection, it may be noted that the European Court of
Human Rights in its 2002 decision in Goodwin v. United Kingdom,67 striking down a blanket ban on transsexuals marrying as a
breach of the right to marry in Article 12 of the ECHR,68 referred, although in a rather self-serving fashion, to the corresponding Charter guarantee's departure, in its view "no doubt
deliberately,"69 from the wording of the ECHR Article in removing the reference to men and women.7 °
Suffice it to say, then, that the Charter, even in its present
non-binding form, can nonetheless be described as a "legally relevant, and constitutionally significant, document" 7 1 in the Community legal order and may yet, particularly once it becomes legally binding, have far-reaching effects through the case law of
both the Court of Justice and importations from the European
Court of Human Rights.
The Charter potentially exacerbates rather than resolves the
possibility of divergence between the Community legal order
and the Convention system and this therefore must remain a
preoccupation for the Court of Justice in the field of fundamental rights. This has led the Court to engage increasingly in a
dialogue, parallel to its dialogue with national courts, with the
Strasbourg Court. It is a dialogue characterized by a spirit of
what has been called "good neighbourliness,"72 in recognition of
the need for both courts to work together and to avoid a "prestige
battle"3 between them. As the then President Wildhaber of the
67. See generally Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 3.
68. See generally id.
69. See id. 1 100.
70. Article 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms reads:
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this fight.
ECHR, supra note 41, art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reads:
The tight to marry and the fight to found a family shall be guaranteed in
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these fights.
Charter, supra note 51, art. 9, O.J. C 364/01, at 4.
71. See D. WYATr ET A., supra note 46, at 285.
72. See Rick Lawson, Current Trend in the Relationship Between Strasbourgand Luxembourg, paper delivered at the Academy of European Law Meeting in Trier (June 2005),
in Litigating Fundamental Rights in the EU, 12 (on file with author).
73. See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
The Accession of the European Union/European Community to the European Convention on
Human Rights, Comments by Pieter Van Dijk, CDL(2007)096, 1 10-12 (Oct. 12, 2007),
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Strasbourg Court has put it:
A major goal [in devising the European human rights protection system of the twenty-first century] should be to reinforce
a harmonious and efficient interplay between the two systems, in other words their complementarity. 4
Both Courts have made great efforts to render such complementarity a reality rather than rhetoric. In a few cases, divergence has arisen simply due to the Court of Justice getting the
'first bite of the apple,' as it were, at interpretation of a Convention right and it has shown a willingness to revise such interpretations in line with subsequent rulings in Strasbourg. For example, in its 1989 judgment in Hoechst AG v. Commission,7 5 the

Court of Justice held that business premises were not covered by
Article 8 ECHR7 6 guaranteeing the inviolability of the home.7 7

The Court subsequently reversed this stance some thirteen years
later in Roquettes Frres SA v. Commission 7' due to an intervening
decision by the Strasbourg Court 79 which held that the Article
did in fact extend to business premises," ° the Court of Justice
explicitly referred to the case law of the Strasbourg Court on the
issue since the Court's decision in Hoechst.
Possibly a major source of divergence is the fact that, by definition, each court pursues different objectives. It has been said
that:
The ECHR interprets the Convention according to the Convention's objectives, while the ECJ interprets it according to
available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL(2007)096-e.pdf [hereinafter
Van Dijk], (citing Franqoise Tulkens, Towards a Greater Normative Coherence in Europe:
The Implications of The Draft Charterof FundamentalRights of the European Union, 21 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 329, 331 (2000)).
74. See Egbert Myjer, Can the EU Join the ECHR-General Conditions and Practical
Arrangements, in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTrVE, 308 (Ingolf Pernice, Juliane Korkott & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2006) (quoting
Luzius Wildhaber, President, Eur. Ct. H.R., Address to the Group of Wise Persons Established to Consider the Continued Effectiveness of the ECHR System (Oct. 18,

2005)).
75. See generally Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88,
[1989] E.C.R. 2859.
76. See ECHR, supra note 41, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 220.
77. See Hoechst AG v. Commission, [1989] E.C.R. 2859,
18.
78. See Roquettes Frhres SA v. Commission, Case 94/00, [2002] E.C.R. I- 9011,
29.
79. See Socibt6 Colas Est v. France, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 133 (2002).
80. See id. at 149,
41.
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the Community's objectives. However, the two sets of objectives do not necessarily coincide. The Convention's aim is to
protect the individual as a human being, while the Community's aim is to further economic and social integration.""
While these aims are not mutually exclusive it is perhaps inevitable that the different legal order in which the Court of Justice operates necessitates a balancing of interests that may not be
familiar to the Strasbourg Court. Firstly, the importance of the
doctrine of primacy of Community law over national law means
that, in certain instances the Community law standard must apply even if it provides less protection than national or international fundamental rights standards. Secondly, uniformity is integral to the functioning of the Community legal order and,
were a national court unwilling to follow a decision of the Court
of Justice because it felt it had other obligations under the European Convention-this could give rise to a "veritable constitutional crisis. '"82 This could readily arise in the context of the Bosphorus doctrine as endorsed by the CFI, to which I refer later.
However, while the Court of Justice is therefore required to
engage in a more difficult balancing act between fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by Community law and fundamental rights
that are of a more universal nature it has at least shown some
reluctance to sacrifice fundamental rights on the altar of Community integration where this can be avoided. This necessitates
continual efforts to reconcile the two, with the doctrine of proportionality used as the favourite medium for doing so, as seen
in cases such as Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags v. Heinrich
Bauer Verlag
and, more recently, Omega Spielhallen v.
Oberbiirgermeisterinder Bundesstadt Bonn.8 4 In Schmidberger v. Austria8 5 in 2003 the Court permitted a fundamental right-free81. See Clemens Rieder, Protecting Human Rights Within the European Union: Who is
Better Qualified to Do the Job-the European Court ofJustice or the European Court of Human
Rights?, 20 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 73, 102 (2005) (quoting A.G. Toth, The European Union
and Human Rights: The Way Forward, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 491, 499 (1997)).
82. See id. at 98 (quoting Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions
Concerning the Role of the European Court ofJustice in the Protection of FundamentalHuman
Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1123
(1986)).
83. See Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case
368/95, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3689,
27.
84. See Omega Spielhallen v. Oberbfirgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case
36/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-9609,
35.
85. See Schmidberger v. Austria, Case 112/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659.

2009]

RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

dom of expression-to 'trump' the right to free movement of
goods having decided that the interference with that freedom
was proportionate.8 6
The Strasbourg Court has also been required to engage in
some nimble footwork to maintain harmony between the two systems. Faced with the erosion of its jurisdiction ratione personae
and ratione materiae as a result of increasing transfers of powers
from Member States to the EU,8 7 it has had to attempt to fill the
resulting lacuna in human rights protection while displaying
considerable reluctance to "pierce the veil"8" of the autonomous
Community legal order by holding EU Member States responsible for any action taken pursuant to Community obligations.
Thus, while in Cantoni v. France"9 in 1996 the Court held
that the fact that the impugned domestic legislation was based
almost word-for-word on a Community Directive did not render
it immune from review under the Convention, the Court has
limited itself to consideration of cases where the respondent
State has been able to exercise discretion when applying Community law." °
The extent of this tricky tightrope act manifests itself in the
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland
case"' which concerned the impounding by the Irish authorities
of an aircraft belonging to the applicant company pursuant to a
European Council Regulation imposing a trade embargo on the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which implemented the United
Nations ("UN") sanctions regime against that state designed to
address the armed conflict and human rights violations occurring there at that time. 2
86. See id.
93, 94.
87. See generally Schmidberger, [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659.
88. See Van Dijk, supra note 73,
10-12.
89. See Cantoni v. France, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1614, 30.
90. See Van Dijk, supra note 73, at 3. While the Court slightly extended its power to
review Community law in Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, in which
it struck down as a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the Convention a decision of a
British court interpreting the EC Treaty, which deprived inhabitants of Gibraltar of the
right to vote in European elections, the Court has consistently shied away from confronting questions such as collective Member State liability for the application of Community law. See Kathrin Kuhnert, Bosphorus-Double Standards in Human Rights Protection?, 2 UTRECHT L. Rev. 177, 183-84 (2006).
91. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 2005-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 107.
92. See id.
61-71 (detailing the relevant provisions of the UN sanctions regime).

546

FORDHAMINTERVATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:531

While the High Court of Ireland originally held that the
Regulation was not applicable to the aircraft in question,9" the
Supreme Court on appeal, having referred the matter to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, received a response to the contrary, which it was therefore bound to apply in
its own decision.9 4 The applicant, having thus lost the benefit of

three years of its four-year lease, subsequently lodged a complaint with the Strasbourg Court claiming violation of its property rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention.9 5
For present purposes, the most salient aspect of the Strasbourg Court's decision is that, while it had previously been
held9 6 that Member States of the EU cannot, by ceding powers to
an international (or supranational) organization, evade their obligations under the Convention, the equivalent fundamental
rights protection afforded by the Community in comparison to
the Convention system was held in Bosphorus to give rise to a
presumption that Member State action taken pursuant to Community obligations is compatible with the Convention, which
could only be rebutted where the protection of Convention
rights in a given case is "manifestly deficient."9 7
While this test renders Community acts more open to review
by the Strasbourg Court, the Bosphorus decision indicates that it
will continue to shy away from strict or overly-specific scrutiny of
such acts.9 8 The test of 'manifest deficiency' has been criticized,
not only as being indeterminate and ill-defined, but for its establishment of, as one commentator has put it, "a relatively low
threshold for the EU, in contrast to the supervision generally
carried out under the ECHR for other [Council of Europe]
Member States." 9

Indeed, it has been questioned whether, due

to the different context in which each court operates and the
93. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport,
Energy and Communications, [1994] 2 I.R.L.M. 551 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).
94. For the European Court of Justice's preliminary ruling, see Bosphorus Hava
Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications,
Case C-84/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3953.
95. See Bosphorus, 2005-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 113,
3.
96. See M. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No.13258/87, Nos. 60-63
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec & Rep. 138, 144-45 (1990).
97. See Bosphorus 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 158, 156.
98. See generally id.
99. See Kuhnert, supra note 90, at 187.
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procedural differences between the a priori nature of the preliminary reference procedure and the a posteriori supervision of the
Strasbourg Court, the protection afforded by Community law is
in fact equivalent to that of the Convention. 0 0
Such concerns have bolstered arguments for accession of
the EU to the Convention. While accession would not remove
the possibility of divergence, it would at least simplify the relationship between the two courts, allowing the Strasbourg Court
to review all acts of the Community and allowing the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights to operate in a similar manner to Bills of
Rights in other Contracting Parties. Most importantly in the national context, it may help to minimize the risk of Member States
being caught between the 'rock' of Community law and the
'hard place' of Convention obligations.
At the same time, accession would serve to further
strengthen the "institutional triangle" between the Court of Justice, the Strasbourg Court and the national courts, which raises
issues that are generally ignored. The central concern arises
from the different way in which each court's decisions affect national legal systems. There is no "schematic way," as the German
Federal Constitutional Court has put it, of enforcing decisions of
the Strasbourg Court,"0 which leaves national courts with considerable discretion. By contrast, decisions of the Court of Justice are, as a matter of Community law, binding on all Member
States, including national courts, and thus leave scant discretion
to those courts.10 2 Moreover, the standards of protection for
fundamental rights laid down in the ECHR are minimum standards,1 0 it always being open to contracting states to provide
higher or stronger protections for such rights. On the other
hand, the degree and scope of protection of such rights as laid
down by the Court ofJustice are definitive standards and neither
States nor their national courts can rely on a claim to give higher
protection to fundamental rights should this conflict with the
uniform application of community law.10 4
These differences become crucial when one considers that
100. See id. at 186-87.
101. See Clemens Rieder, supra note 81, at 100.
102. See Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64 [1964] E.C.R. 584, 594.
103. See id. at 585.
104. See EC Treaty, supra note 20, art. 228, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 145; Costa, [1964]
E.C.R. 584, 594.
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the Strasbourg Court takes a consensus-based approach to
human rights issues, referring where possible to substantial consensus between contracting parties on a given issue in rendering
its decisions. This so-called consensus is often founded, not on
the provisions of national constitutions, but on a tabulation or
examination of legislative provisions, or even 'emerging trends,'
at the national level where a majority of states recognize a particular legal right or give it a particular degree of protection, often
to the detriment of the text of the Convention itself. The use of
consensus as an interpretive tool in this manner is itself open to
criticism and its legitimacy must be further weakened when
transported to the Community context, as substantial 'consensus' in the Convention context-among forty-seven states-does
not necessarily equate to consensus between the twenty-seven
EU Member States.
Even in the current climate, where the EU is not a Party to
the Convention, the deference shown by the Court of Justice to
the Convention system through adherence to Convention case
law means that Community law concerning fundamental rights
is, to an extent, being 'ghostwritten' by the Strasbourg Court.
Thus, decisions of the latter court which do not have direct or
erga omnes effect on EU Member States are accorded such effect
when used as precedent by the Court of Justice in its judgments.
This in turn may give rise to questions concerning the legitimacy
of Court of Justice decisions on these issues for the same reasons
as they have arisen with regard to the interpretative methods of
the Strasbourg Court.
This is potentially controversial considering signs of the
Court of Justice's increasing willingness to 'interfere,' in the
name of fundamental rights, in areas which have traditionally
been the preserve of the Member States. A notable example is
the Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Akrich case, 10 5 concerning immigration, where the Court instructed a British court
that it must have regard to right of the spouse to respect for her
family life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR in assessing the application of her husband, a non-EU (or European Economic Area
("EEA")) national to remain in Britain where the marriage was

105. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Akrich, Case C-109/01, [2003] E.C.R. I9607
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genuine. 106
This may be compared with earlier cases such as Demirel v.
Stadt Schwdbisch Gmiind'0 7 where, in a case concerning the
reunification of a Turkish national with his family, the Court of
Justice said that it had "no power to examine the compatibility
with the European Convention on Human Rights of national
legislation lying outside the scope of Community law"' 8 since
there were no Community regulations specifically referring to
the conditions for the "family reunification of Turkish workers
lawfully settled in the Community."1" 9
A further example would be Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH ° in which the Court held that a
reference for a preliminary ruling relating to the application of
Article 28 EC could not be considered inapplicable "simply because all the facts of the specific case before the national court
are confined to a single Member State.""' In this manner, the
"institutional triangle" that now pertains may be seen as threatening to become a Bermuda triangle in which the importance of
national constitutions is lost.
As an international treaty the European Convention on
Human Rights is not directly applicable in every state which is a
party to it and, in many of the states which are a party it may not
have primacy over national law or in particular over national
constitutions. Moreover, a state, faced with what it perceived as a
wholly unacceptable overriding of a value enshrined in a national constitution, has the express power to repudiate the Convention.1 12 Even though such a step may involve political difficulties at an international level those difficulties could, in an extreme situation, be outweighed by domestic political difficulties.
On the other hand the judicial rulings of the Court of Justice,
including when they "import" a Strasbourg Court decision, take
precedence over national law, including constitutional law, and
106. See id. 61.
107. Demirel v. Stadt Schwdbisch Gmtnd, Case 12/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3719.
108. See generally id.
109. See id. 28.
110. Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH, Case 71/02,
[2004] E.C.R. 1-3025.
111. See id. 19.
112. See ECHR, supra note 41, art. 54, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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are binding on national courts who have a duty to apply them. 13
It is in that context that there is at least a perceived increased
risk that national constitutions, and some of their core values,
could be emasculated by decisions taken at the European level
under the extended rubric of rights protection.
Should the Lisbon Treaty be adopted-and, as I have stated
above, this is now less assured-with its Charter of Rights, and
followed by accession of the European Union to the Convention
on Human Rights, inherent tensions would inevitably exist in a
post-Lisbon Europe between the judicial organs that traditionally have a final responsibility in defining and protecting individual rights. These tensions may in turn raise questions concerning the legitimacy of an international or a supranational court
making decisions involving core constitutional powers and moral
values. However, any such potential problems, either real or
perceived, are far different from the challenges which the European Community faced fifty years ago when there was no Charter and the Treaties were entirely silent on fundamental rights.
That was a scenario fraught with pitfalls which were overcome by
the combined judicial wisdom of the European Court of Justice
in Luxembourg and national courts. The potential post-Lisbon
problems stem, on the contrary, from an over-endowment of
sources of individual rights and institutions charged with protecting them at the supranational and international level. Given
the history of the past fifty years it can only be hoped that over
time the same wisdom can be brought to bear to find a means by
which the judicial protection of fundamental rights can be
achieved in a coherent and legitimate manner with due regard
for the diversity of Member States to which the preamble of the
Lisbon Treaty pays tribute.

113. See EC Treaty, supra note 20, art. 228,
E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R 584, 594.
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